The Effect of Tracking Students by Ability into Different Schools: A Natural Experiment
Paris School of Economics (PSE)
Paris School of Economics (PSE); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
January 5, 2011
FEEM Working Paper No. 152.2010
The tracking of pupils by ability into elite and non-elite schools represents a controversial policy in many countries. There is no consensus on how large the elite track should be and little agreement on the effects of any further increase in its size. This paper presents a natural experiment where the increase in the size of the elite track was followed by a significant improvement in average educational outcomes. This experiment provides a rare opportunity to isolate the overall effect of allowing entry to the elite track for a group that was previously only at the margin of being admitted.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
Keywords: Education, Tracking, Selection
JEL Classification: I2working papers series
Date posted: January 8, 2011
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.313 seconds