Governance Choice on a Serial Network
David Matthew Levinson
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities
August 24, 2008
Public Choice, Vol. 141, pp. 189-212, 2009
This paper analyzes governance choice in a two-level federation in providing road infrastructure across jurisdictions. Two models are proposed to predict the choice of centralized or decentralized spending structure on a serial road network shared by two districts. While the first model considers simple Pigouvian behavior of governments, the second explicitly models political forces at both a local and central level. Both models led to the conclusions that the spending structure is chosen based on a satisfactory comprise between benefits and costs associated with alternative decision-making processes, and that governance choice may spontaneously shift as the infrastructure improves temporally.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 24
Keywords: Governance choice, Transportation, Infrastructure, Fiscal federalism
JEL Classification: R48, R40, H54
Date posted: January 6, 2011 ; Last revised: January 22, 2011
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