Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735587
 
 

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Patent Hold Up and Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation


Luke Froeb


Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

Bernhard Ganglmair


University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management - Department of Finance & Managerial Economics

Gregory J. Werden


U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

December 3, 2010

Journal of Industrial Economics 60(2), pp. 249-273, June 2012

Abstract:     
Licensing technology essential to a standard can present a hold-up problem. After designing new products incorporating a standard, a manufacturer could be confronted by an innovator asserting patent rights to essential technology. A damages remedy provided by antitrust or some other body of law solves this hold-up problem, inducing the socially optimal level of investment by the manufacturer, but it can reduce the innovator's licensing revenue and thereby retard innovation. The availability of an ex post damages remedy similarly alters the licensing terms in ex ante bargaining, with the result that fewer socially beneficial R\&D projects are undertaken.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: patent hold-up, option contract, reasonable and nondiscriminatory royalties (RAND), antitrust

JEL Classification: D21, K21, L14, L4

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Date posted: February 11, 2009 ; Last revised: October 22, 2014

Suggested Citation

Froeb, Luke and Ganglmair, Bernhard and Werden, Gregory J., Patent Hold Up and Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation (December 3, 2010). Journal of Industrial Economics 60(2), pp. 249-273, June 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735587 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1735587

Contact Information

Luke M. Froeb (Contact Author)
Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-9057 (Phone)
615-343-7177 (Fax)

Bernhard Ganglmair
University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management - Department of Finance & Managerial Economics ( email )
800 W Campbell Rd (SM31)
Richardson, TX 75080
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.utdallas.edu/~ganglmair
Gregory J. Werden
U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division ( email )
450 Fifth Street, NW
9th Floor
Washington, DC 20530
United States
202-307-6366 (Phone)
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