Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737937
 
 

References (39)



 
 

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Exploring the Role Delaware Plays as a Domestic Tax Haven


Scott Dyreng


Duke University

Bradley P. Lindsey


North Carolina State University

Jacob R. Thornock


University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

Sept 24, 2012

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Offshore tax havens, such as the Cayman Islands, have been shown to facilitate corporate tax avoidance. However, academic research has overlooked the possibility that the state of Delaware could serve a similar role domestically. We find that tax factors play an important role in determining where to locate subsidiaries and that these factors are economically larger than the legal and governance factors that are typically considered important determinants of incorporation decisions. In addition, the tax savings of placing subsidiaries in the state of Delaware are economically meaningful. For firms that appear to engage in tax strategies involving Delaware, we find a reduction in the state effective tax rate of approximately 1.5 percentage points, which is similar in magnitude to the tax savings of having foreign haven operations. Our results are consistent with Delaware serving as a domestic haven against state corporate taxation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: Delaware, Tax Haven, Tax Law, Tax Aggressiveness, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: G38, H25, H71, K22

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Date posted: January 12, 2011 ; Last revised: April 11, 2013

Suggested Citation

Dyreng, Scott and Lindsey, Bradley P. and Thornock, Jacob R., Exploring the Role Delaware Plays as a Domestic Tax Haven (Sept 24, 2012). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737937 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1737937

Contact Information

Scott Dyreng
Duke University ( email )
Box 90120, Fuqua School of Business
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States
Bradley P. Lindsey (Contact Author)
North Carolina State University ( email )
Campus Box 8113
3152 Nelson Hall
Raleigh, NC 27695-8113
United States
919-515-4434 (Phone)
919-515-4446 (Fax)
Jacob Thornock
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )
Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States
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