Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1739137
 
 

Citations (7)



 


 



Listing Choices and Self-Regulation: The Experience of the AIM


Joseph Gerakos


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Mark H. Lang


University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Mark G. Maffett


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

January 12, 2011

Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 11-04

Abstract:     
We compare companies listing on the London AIM to regulated exchanges in the US and UK. The AIM is unique in that it is privately-regulated and relies on Nominated Advisors to provide oversight rather than traditional regulators. We find that AIM firms perform poorly on a variety of dimensions. Their post-listing returns significantly underperform stocks on other exchanges. Liquidity is low and there is evidence of substantial information asymmetry. Results are similar across subsets of firms including US firms that directly list on AIM, firms that cross list, and domestic listings. AIM firms do not appear to distinguish themselves through choice of Nomad. Failure rates are very high and there is no evidence that significant numbers develop into “highfliers” or graduate to better exchanges. AIM stocks even underperform stocks that trade on the unregulated “Pink Sheets” in the US, inconsistent with a significant bonding effect of AIM listing.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

Keywords: Securities Regulation, International Accounting

JEL Classification: F30

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: January 13, 2011 ; Last revised: September 19, 2012

Suggested Citation

Gerakos, Joseph and Lang, Mark H. and Maffett, Mark G., Listing Choices and Self-Regulation: The Experience of the AIM (January 12, 2011). Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 11-04. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1739137 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1739137

Contact Information

Joseph J. Gerakos (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Ave.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-6882 (Phone)
Mark H. Lang
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill ( email )
Kenan-Flagler Business School
McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States
919-962-1644 (Phone)
919-962-4727 (Fax)

Mark G. Maffett
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,493
Downloads: 370
Download Rank: 26,216
Citations:  7

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.312 seconds