Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1739443
 
 

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Deliberation, Disclosure of Information, and Voting


Matthew O. Jackson


Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)

Xu Tan


University of Washington - Economics

June 2012


Abstract:     
A set of voters consults experts before voting over two alternatives. Experts observe private signals about the values of the alternatives and can reveal their information or conceal it, but cannot lie. We examine how disclosure and voting vary with preference biases, signal precision, and the voting rule. Unanimity rule can lead to greater information revelation and total utility than simple majority rule. The voting rule that maximizes information disclosure need not coincide with the voting rule that maximizes total utility. In a large enough society, full information revelation is approximated via any voting rule.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Voting, Information, Disclosure, Deliberation, Experts, Committees, Sender-Receiver

JEL Classification: D72, D71, D83

working papers series


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Date posted: January 13, 2011 ; Last revised: July 10, 2012

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Matthew O. and Tan, Xu, Deliberation, Disclosure of Information, and Voting (June 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1739443 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1739443

Contact Information

Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm
Santa Fe Institute
1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States
Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) ( email )
180 Dundas Street West, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
Canada
Xu Tan
University of Washington - Economics ( email )
Seattle, WA
United States
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