Endogenous Sunk Costs, Quality Competition and Welfare: A Technical Note
George S. Ford
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies
Michael L. Stern
Auburn University; Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies
December 16, 2010
Quality competition, by increasing sunk costs, may produce levels of concentration even higher than expected in its absence. Based on Sutton's model of endogenous sunk costs and quality competition, we show that consumers, under certain conditions, may benefit from higher industry concentration driven by an increase in endogenous sunk costs despite the effects on concentration and likely attenuation of price competition.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 8
Keywords: Sunk Costs, Market Structure, Quality Competition, Consumer Welfare, John Sutton, Communications, Telecommunications, FCC
JEL Classification: L00working papers series
Date posted: January 15, 2011 ; Last revised: May 17, 2011
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