Will the Convergence Towards a 'High Quality' Accounting Standard Be the Natural Result? A Study on a Game Theory for the Consequences of Global Accounting Convergence
January 16, 2011
The purpose of this paper is to study whether or not the convergence towards a 'high quality' accounting standard will be the natural result. One of the purposes of IASB is to make high quality accounting standards because of the convergence. It seems that the best strategy for the convergence, but can it be true? The result of this study shows the convergence to a 'high quality' standard is not always the natural result. This is an interesting consequence against the objective of IASB.
The methodology in this research is based on a comparative institutional analysis (Aoki 2001, Grief 2006) and we think an institution as the Nash equilibrium of game theory (Binmore 2010). In this study, I adopt a 3×3 coordination game because one of the essential factors of global accounting convergence is to coordinate accounting standards (Hail et al.2009, Taguchi 2009).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: game theory, comparative institutional analysis, the Nash equilibrium, IFRS, IASB, coordination game
JEL Classification: C70, D74, G28, K22, M41, P51working papers series
Date posted: January 18, 2011
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