Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1742220
 
 

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The Corporate Pyramid Fable (Revised)


Steven A. Bank


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Brian R. Cheffins


University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

December 20, 2010

Business History Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 435-58, 2010
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 11/04
UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 11-02

Abstract:     
Although corporate pyramids are currently commonplace world-wide and although there have been “noteworthy pyramiders” in American business history, this controversial form of corporate organization is now a rarity in the United States. The conventional wisdom is that corporate pyramids disappeared in the U.S. when New Deal policymakers began taxing dividends paid to corporate shareholders. This version of events is more fable than truth. The introduction of the intercorporate dividend tax did not foster a rapid dismantling of corporate pyramids. Instead, pyramidal arrangements were already rare in the U.S., other than in the utilities sector, and the demise of utility pyramids was prompted by the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 rather than tax reform.

This version should be referred to in preference to the version that appeared in print in the Business History Review, as this version incorporates a number of editorial changes not incorporated into the print version.

This is the revised and published version of an earlier working paper: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1544023.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: Corporate Pyramids, Dividends, corporate Taxation, Holding Companies

JEL Classification: G30

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Date posted: January 18, 2011 ; Last revised: January 23, 2011

Suggested Citation

Bank, Steven A. and Cheffins, Brian R., The Corporate Pyramid Fable (Revised) (December 20, 2010). Business History Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 435-58, 2010; University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 11/04; UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 11-02. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1742220

Contact Information

Steven A. Bank (Contact Author)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-794-7601 (Phone)
Brian R. Cheffins
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )
10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom
+44 1223 330084 (Phone)
+44 1223 330055 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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