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Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural LawAnthony D'AmatoNorthwestern University - School of Law January 19, 2011 American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, p. 202, 1981 Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 11-04 Abstract: I will contend that Fuller’s secular or “procedural” natural law, as described by Moffat, does not cover the theoretical position that could be occupied by a substantive natural lawyer, that such a theoretical position is viable today, and that there are some key elements in Fuller’s theory that actually conflict with substantive natural law and might therefore be criticized from that perspective.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 16 Keywords: Jurisprudence, Natural Law, Fuller (Lon), Hart, Dworkin, Cicero, Bentham, Austin, Aquinas JEL Classification: K19, K49 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: January 22, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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