Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law
Northwestern University - School of Law
January 19, 2011
American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, p. 202, 1981
Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 11-04
I will contend that Fuller’s secular or “procedural” natural law, as described by Moffat, does not cover the theoretical position that could be occupied by a substantive natural lawyer, that such a theoretical position is viable today, and that there are some key elements in Fuller’s theory that actually conflict with substantive natural law and might therefore be criticized from that perspective.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 16
Keywords: Jurisprudence, Natural Law, Fuller (Lon), Hart, Dworkin, Cicero, Bentham, Austin, Aquinas
JEL Classification: K19, K49Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: January 22, 2011
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