Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1747087
 
 

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Constitutional Design in the Ancient World


Adriaan Lanni


Harvard Law School

Adrian Vermeule


Harvard Law School

January 24, 2011

Stanford Law Review, Forthcoming
Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 11-06

Abstract:     
This paper identifies two distinctive features of ancient constitutional design that have largely disappeared from the modern world: constitution-making by single individuals and constitution-making by foreigners. We consider the virtues and vices of these features, and argue that under plausible conditions single founders and outsider founders offer advantages over constitution-making by representative bodies of citizens, even in the modern world. We also discuss the implications of adding single founders and outsider founders to the constitutional toolkit by describing how constitutional legitimacy would work, and how constitutional interpretation would be conducted, under constitutions that display either or both of the distinctive features of ancient constitutional design.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

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Date posted: January 25, 2011 ; Last revised: March 24, 2011

Suggested Citation

Lanni, Adriaan and Vermeule, Adrian, Constitutional Design in the Ancient World (January 24, 2011). Stanford Law Review, Forthcoming; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 11-06. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1747087

Contact Information

Adriaan Lanni
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Adrian Vermeule (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1525 Massachusetts
Griswold 500
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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