An Economic Perspective on Preemption
Keith N. Hylton
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
January 24, 2011
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 11-03
This paper has two goals. The first is to present an economic theory of preemption as a choice among regulatory regimes. The optimal regime choice model is used to generate specific implications for the court decisions on preemption of products liability claims. The second objective is to extrapolate from the regime choice model to consider its implications for broader controversies about preemption.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 24
Keywords: preemption, products liability, risk-utility analysis, error cost analysis, optimal regime choice, legislative intent
JEL Classification: K13working papers series
Date posted: January 25, 2011 ; Last revised: June 30, 2011
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