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An Economic Perspective on Preemption

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

January 24, 2011

Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 11-03

This paper has two goals. The first is to present an economic theory of preemption as a choice among regulatory regimes. The optimal regime choice model is used to generate specific implications for the court decisions on preemption of products liability claims. The second objective is to extrapolate from the regime choice model to consider its implications for broader controversies about preemption.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: preemption, products liability, risk-utility analysis, error cost analysis, optimal regime choice, legislative intent

JEL Classification: K13

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Date posted: January 25, 2011 ; Last revised: June 30, 2011

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., An Economic Perspective on Preemption (January 24, 2011). Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 11-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1747120 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1747120

Contact Information

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)
Boston University - School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)
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