Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1747181
 


 



Tying Law in Microsoft I and II: The Secret Art of Magic?


Nicolas Petit


University of Liege - School of Law

Norman Neyrinck


University of Liege

November 16, 2010

Brussels School of Competition Working Paper Series No. 1/2010

Abstract:     
This paper seeks to uncover an inconvenient truth. The Microsoft decisions are not tying cases. Rather, the two decisions taken by the EU Commission against Microsoft – i.e. the Windows Media Player (“WMP”) case of 2004 and the Internet Explorer (“IE”) case of 2009 – mark departures from conventional tying analysis (I). First, they deviate from standard tying law in that in the Microsoft cases, a key component of abusive tying, namely coercion, is missing (II). Second, the Microsoft decisions share many analogies with “essential facility” cases. One may thus question to what extent the Commission has not pursued disguised refusal to supply cases (III).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: WMP, IE, Windows Media Player, Internet Explorer, Microsoft, Tying, tying, competition law, competition, essential facility, refusal to supply, refusal, supply

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Date posted: August 15, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Petit, Nicolas and Neyrinck, Norman, Tying Law in Microsoft I and II: The Secret Art of Magic? (November 16, 2010). Brussels School of Competition Working Paper Series No. 1/2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1747181 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1747181

Contact Information

Nicolas Petit
University of Liege - School of Law ( email )
B-4000 Liege
Belgium
Norman Neyrinck (Contact Author)
University of Liege ( email )
B-4000 Liege
Belgium
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