Why Royalties? Evidence from French Distribution Networks
University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)
January 31, 2010
University of Lyon 2 Groupe d'Analyse et de Theorie Economique (GATE) Working Paper No. 1102
This empirical note deals with the contractual design of relationships in distribution networks. In the framework of agency theory, I study the royalty rate as an incentive device for the upstream firm in maintaining brand-name value, using recent French data to estimate probit models. The results are consistent with the analytical framework.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
Keywords: Vertical Relationships, Distribution Networks, Contract Design, Two-Sided Moral Hazard
JEL Classification: C12, L14working papers series
Date posted: January 29, 2011 ; Last revised: February 1, 2011
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.782 seconds