Informational Rents, Macroeconomic Rents, and Efficient Bailouts
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8216
We analyze government interventions to alleviate debt overhang among banks. Interventions generate two types of rents. Informational rents arise from opportunistic participation based on private information while macroeconomic rents arise from free riding. Minimizing informational rents is a security design problem and we show that warrants and preferred stocks are the optimal instruments. Minimizing macroeconomic rents requires the government to condition implementation on sufficient participation. Informational rents always impose a cost, but if macroeconomic rents are large, efficient recapitalizations can be profitable.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 57
Keywords: bailouts, crises, debt overhang, recapitalization
JEL Classification: G01, G2, G28, G33, G38, H0, H2, H81working papers series
Date posted: January 31, 2011
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