Paying to Remove Advertisements
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
February 13, 2009
IFN Working Paper No. 789
Media firms sometimes allow consumers to pay to remove advertisements from an advertisement-based product. We formally examine an ad-based monopolists incentives to introduce this option. When deciding whether to introduce the option to pay, the monopolist compares the potential direct revenues from consumers with lost advertising revenues from not intermediating those consumers to advertisers. If the option is introduced, the media firm increases advertising quantity to make the option to pay more attractive. This hurts consumers, but bene ts the media firm and advertisers. Total welfare may increase or decrease. Perhaps surprisingly, more annoying advertisements may lead to an increase in advertising quantity.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 15
Keywords: Advertising, damaged goods, media markets, price discrimination, two-sided markets, vertical differentiation
JEL Classification: D42, L15, L59, M37working papers series
Date posted: January 31, 2011
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.422 seconds