Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1750144
 


 



Antitrust Law and the Promotion of Democracy and Economic Growth


Niels Petersen


Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; New York University – School of Law

January 1, 2011

Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 9, 2013 (Forthcoming)
MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2011/3

Abstract:     
There is a considerable debate in the legal literature about the purpose of antitrust institutions. Some argue that antitrust law merely serves the purpose of economic growth, while others have a broader perspective on the function of antitrust, maintaining that the prevention of economic concentration is an important means to promote democratization and democratic stability. This contribution seeks to test the empirical assumptions of this normative debate. Using panel data of 154 states from 1960 to 2007, it analyzes whether antitrust law actually has a positive effect on democracy and economic growth. The paper finds that antitrust law has a strongly positive effect on the level of GDP per capita and economic growth. However, there is no significant positive effect on the level of democracy. It is suggested that these results might be due to the current structure of existing antitrust laws, which are designed to promote economic efficiency rather than to prevent economic concentration.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: antitrust law, economic growth, democracy, panel data, first difference

JEL Classification: K21, L00

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Date posted: January 31, 2011 ; Last revised: April 1, 2013

Suggested Citation

Petersen, Niels, Antitrust Law and the Promotion of Democracy and Economic Growth (January 1, 2011). Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 9, 2013 (Forthcoming); MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2011/3. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1750144 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1750144

Contact Information

Niels Petersen (Contact Author)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
+49 228 914 1667 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/team/page/niels_petersen
New York University – School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
HOME PAGE: http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/fellows/12-13/NielsPetersen.html
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