Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1750371
 
 

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Do the SEC’s Enforcement Preferences Affect Corporate Misconduct?


Simi Kedia


Rutgers Business School

Shivaram Rajgopal


Emory University - Goizueta Business School

January 28, 2011

Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Recent frauds have questioned the efficacy of the SEC’s enforcement program. We hypothesize that differences in firms’ information sets about SEC enforcement and constraints facing the SEC affect firms’ proclivity to adopt aggressive accounting practices. We find that firms located closer to the SEC and in areas with greater past SEC enforcement activity, both proxies for firms’ information about SEC enforcement, are less likely to restate their financial statements. Consistent with the resource-constrained SEC view, the SEC is more likely to investigate firms located closer to its offices. Our results suggest that regulation is most effective when it is local.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

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Date posted: January 28, 2011 ; Last revised: June 17, 2011

Suggested Citation

Kedia, Simi and Rajgopal, Shivaram, Do the SEC’s Enforcement Preferences Affect Corporate Misconduct? (January 28, 2011). Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1750371

Contact Information

Simi Kedia
Rutgers Business School ( email )
117 Levin
94 Rockafellar Road
Piscataway, NJ
United States
8484454195 (Phone)
Shivaram Rajgopal (Contact Author)
Emory University - Goizueta Business School ( email )
1300 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322-2722
United States
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