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Common Knowledge in Legal Reasoning About Evidence


Fabrizio Macagno


Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Douglas Walton


University of Winnipeg - Department of Philosophy

2005

International Commentary on Evidence, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 1-42, 2005

Abstract:     
It is shown how tools of argument analysis currently being developed in artificial intelligence can be applied to legal judgments about evidence based on common knowledge. Chains of reasoning containing generalizations and implicit premises that express common knowledge are modeled using argument diagrams and argumentation schemes. A controversial thesis is argued for. It is the thesis that such premises can best be seen as commitments accepted by parties to a dispute, and thus tentatively accepted, subject to default should new evidence come in that would overturn them. Common knowledge, on this view, is not knowledge, strictly speaking, but a kind of provisional acceptance of a proposition based on its not being disputed, and its being generally accepted as true, but subject to exceptions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: presumption, defeasible reasoning, Wigmore chart, generalization, crime scene

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Date posted: January 31, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Macagno, Fabrizio and Walton, Douglas, Common Knowledge in Legal Reasoning About Evidence (2005). International Commentary on Evidence, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 1-42, 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1751661

Contact Information

Fabrizio Macagno (Contact Author)
Universidade Nova de Lisboa ( email )
Av. Berna 26 I&D Building, office 4.02
Lisbon, 1069-061
Portugal
HOME PAGE: http://fabriziomacagno.altervista.org/
Douglas Walton
University of Winnipeg - Department of Philosophy ( email )
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3B 2E9
Canada
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