Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1754565
 
 

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Brown Shoe Versus the Horizontal Merger Guidelines


Keith N. Hylton


Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law

February 3, 2011

Review of Industrial Organization, 2011
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 11-05

Abstract:     
The new Horizontal Merger Guidelines, if treated by courts as a source of law, would reduce the discretion traditionally exercised by courts in defining relevant markets and market power in merger cases. This is an undesirable shift in the balance of power because courts have used the market power inquiry stage of merger analysis as a general checkpoint or weigh station for evaluating factors relevant to the welfare effects of a merger.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 13

Keywords: horizontal merger guidelines, Clayton Act Section 7, Brown Shoe, market definition, market power, error cost analysis, relevant market, pricing power, industrial rationalization

JEL Classification: K21, K22, K23, K29

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Date posted: February 4, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., Brown Shoe Versus the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (February 3, 2011). Review of Industrial Organization, 2011; Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 11-05. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1754565

Contact Information

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)
Boston University ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)
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