Brown Shoe Versus the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Keith N. Hylton
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
February 3, 2011
Review of Industrial Organization, 2011
Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 11-05
The new Horizontal Merger Guidelines, if treated by courts as a source of law, would reduce the discretion traditionally exercised by courts in defining relevant markets and market power in merger cases. This is an undesirable shift in the balance of power because courts have used the market power inquiry stage of merger analysis as a general checkpoint or weigh station for evaluating factors relevant to the welfare effects of a merger.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 13
Keywords: horizontal merger guidelines, Clayton Act Section 7, Brown Shoe, market definition, market power, error cost analysis, relevant market, pricing power, industrial rationalization
JEL Classification: K21, K22, K23, K29Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: February 4, 2011
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