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Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting RecordsEyal BaharadUniversity of Haifa - Department of Economics; Bar Ilan University - Department of Economics Jacob Goldbergeraffiliation not provided to SSRN Moshe Koppelaffiliation not provided to SSRN Shmuel NitzanBar Ilan University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) January 31, 2011 CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3323 Abstract: The difficulty of optimal decision making in uncertain dichotomous choice settings is that it requires information on the expertise of the decision makers (voters). This paper presents a method of optimally weighting voters even without testing them against questions with known right answers. The method is based on the realization that if we can see how voters vote on a variety of questions, it is possible to gauge their respective degrees of expertise by comparing their votes in a suitable fashion, even without knowing the right answers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30 JEL Classification: D70 working papers seriesDate posted: February 8, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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