Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services
University of Maryland - Department of Economics
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Gregory L. Rosston
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Stanford Graduate School of Business
February 7, 2011
Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 406
Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.
Keywords: auctions, spectrum auctions, market design
JEL Classification: D44, C78, L96
Date posted: February 8, 2011
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