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Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless ServicesPeter CramtonUniversity of Maryland - Department of Economics Evan Kwerelaffiliation not provided to SSRN Gregory L. RosstonStanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Andrzej SkrzypaczStanford Graduate School of Business February 7, 2011 Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 406 Abstract: Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.
Keywords: auctions, spectrum auctions, market design JEL Classification: D44, C78, L96 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: February 8, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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