Abstract

 


 



EU and U.S. Solutions to Systemic Risk and Their Potential Influence on a World Trade Organization Approach


Benjamin Austrin-Willis


affiliation not provided to SSRN

January 14, 2011

Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper

Abstract:     
As the 2008 financial crisis spread globally, it became widely apparent that an essential ingredient to preventing future systemic crises was reform of the regulation of financial markets. Two ambitious initiatives for regulatory reform are the European Union's European System of Financial Supervision and the United States' Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. These two approaches to addressing systemic risk differ greatly in both their specificity and the level of authority they entrust to centralized regulators. They provide distinct models on which a potential global systemic risk regulator could be based – a regulator that could be formed via the World Trade Organization, which has successfully liberalized global trade and has a role in global finance. This paper explores the EU and U.S. systemic risk regulatory models and explains why the EU approach is better suited for adaptation to the WTO.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: Systemic Risk, Financial Crisis, EU, Europe, European Union, U.S., United States, WTO, World Trade Organization, Dodd-Frank, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, European System Of Financial Supervision, SIFI, TARP, ESFS, European Banking Authority, EBA, Finance, Trade

JEL Classification: F00, F10, F23, F30, F36, G18, G20, G21, G28, H10, H11, H77, K00, K20, K33, N40, O16, O51, O52, O57

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 11, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Austrin-Willis, Benjamin, EU and U.S. Solutions to Systemic Risk and Their Potential Influence on a World Trade Organization Approach (January 14, 2011). Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1758733 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1758733

Contact Information

Benjamin Austrin-Willis (Contact Author)
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 649
Downloads: 126
Download Rank: 113,327

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.406 seconds