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Free Entry, Market Diffusion, and Social Inefficiency with Endogenously Growing Demand


Hiroshi Kitamura


Kyoto Sangyo University

Akira Miyaoka


Osaka University - Graduate School of Economics

Misato Sato


George Washington University - Graduate School of Economics

November 22, 2012

Osaka University Economics and Business Discussion Paper No. 11-04

Abstract:     
This paper analyzes market diffusion in the presence of oligopolistic interaction among firms. Market demand is positively related to past market size because of consumer learning, networks, and bandwagon effects. Firms enter the market freely in each period with fixed costs and compete in quantities. We demonstrate that the nature of the inefficiency under free entry can change as the market grows, and more importantly, that S-shaped diffusion can be a signal that the number of firms under free entry is initially insufficient, but eventually excessive.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Free Entry, Market Diffusion, Intertemporal Externalities, Oligopolistic Interaction, S-shaped Diffusion

JEL Classification: D11, L11, L14

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Date posted: February 13, 2011 ; Last revised: November 23, 2012

Suggested Citation

Kitamura, Hiroshi, Miyaoka, Akira and Sato, Misato, Free Entry, Market Diffusion, and Social Inefficiency with Endogenously Growing Demand (November 22, 2012). Osaka University Economics and Business Discussion Paper No. 11-04 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759192 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1759192

Contact Information

Hiroshi Kitamura (Contact Author)
Kyoto Sangyo University ( email )
Motoyama, Kamigamo, Kita-Ku
Kyoto, Kyoto 603-8555
Japan
HOME PAGE: http://www.geocities.jp/hiro4kitamura/index.html
Akira Miyaoka
Osaka University - Graduate School of Economics ( email )
1-7 Machikaneyama
Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043
Japan
HOME PAGE: http://www.geocities.jp/akira_miyaoka/
Misato Sato
George Washington University - Graduate School of Economics ( email )
2121 I Street NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States
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