Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759551
 
 

Footnotes (209)



 


 



Encroachment, Adverse Possession, and Labor Theory


Eric R. Claeys


George Mason University

October 21, 2013

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-21

Abstract:     
John Locke's theory of property is assumed to refer to one of two alternatives — a labor-desert theory and a libertarian alternative. Locke's theory of property is also assumed to be rigid and extreme because it requires that property rights be protected no matter what the social consequences. Virtually all property scholars disregard a far suppler and more practical understanding of Lockean labor theory, consistent with medieval and early Enlightenment natural law reasoning, called here "productive labor theory." This Article restates the case for productive labor theory, distinguishes it from its libertarian and labor-desert alternatives, and shows how it integrates consequentialist practical reasoning into the effort to secure natural property rights. The Article illustrates using the prima facie case for trespass to land, the defense for adverse possession, and the principles that specify whether continuing encroachments are rectified by permanent damages or injunctive relief.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 76

Keywords: action, American, Blackstone, British, canonical, control, deontological, dominion, Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, English, improvement, intentional, investment, Joseph Singer, Katyal, land, law, lease, liability, mortgage, purposive, Radin, Richard Epstein, rights, sale, squatter, title, value, vesting

JEL Classification: D23, H82, K11, P16

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 11, 2011 ; Last revised: October 24, 2013

Suggested Citation

Claeys, Eric R., Encroachment, Adverse Possession, and Labor Theory (October 21, 2013). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-21. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759551 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1759551

Contact Information

Eric R. Claeys (Contact Author)
George Mason University ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Room 420
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
(703) 993-8247 (Phone)
(703) 993-8202 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 636
Downloads: 117
Download Rank: 140,326
Footnotes:  209

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.329 seconds