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Quality Competition or Quality Cooperation? License-Type and the Strategic Nature of Open Source vs. Closed Source Business Models


Sebastian Von Engelhardt


University of Jena - Economics Department

June 3, 2010

University of Jena Economic Research Paper No. 2010-034

Abstract:     
In the ICT sector, product-software is an important factor for the quality of the products (e.g. cell phones). In this context, open source software enables firms to avoid quality competition as they can cooperate on quality without an explicit contract. The economics of open source (OS) versus closed source (CS) business models are analyzed in a general two-stage model that combines aspects of non-cooperative R&D with the theory of differentiated oligopolies: In stage one, firms develop software, either as OS or CS, or as a an OS-CS-mix if the license allows. In stage two, firms bundle this with complementary products and compete à la Cournot. The model allows for horizontal product differentiation in stage two. The finding are: 1.) While CS-decisions are always strategic substitutes, OS-decisions can be strategic complements. Furthermore, CS is a strategic substitute to OS and vice versa. 2.) The type of OS-license plays a crucial role: only if the license prohibits a direct OS-CS code mix (like the GPL), then Nash-equilibria with firms producing OS code exist for all parameters. 3.) In the equilibrium of a mixed industry with restricted licenses, OS-firms offer lower quality than their CS-rivals.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: Open Source, Open Source Software, Commercial Open Source, Cournot, R&D

JEL Classification: D43, D45, L17, O34

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Date posted: February 12, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Engelhardt, Sebastian von, Quality Competition or Quality Cooperation? License-Type and the Strategic Nature of Open Source vs. Closed Source Business Models (June 3, 2010). University of Jena Economic Research Paper No. 2010-034. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1760017 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1760017

Contact Information

Sebastian Von Engelhardt (Contact Author)
University of Jena - Economics Department ( email )
Carl-Zeiss-Str. 3
07743 Jena
Germany
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