Emotion, Neuroscience, and Law: A Comment on Darwin and Greene
Georgetown University Law Center
February 14, 2011
Emotion Review, Forthcoming
Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 11-26
Darwin’s (1871) observation that evolution has produced in us certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct that lack any obvious basis in individual utility is a useful springboard from which to clarify the role of emotion in moral judgment. The problem is whether a certain class of moral judgments is “constituted” or “driven by” emotion (Greene 2008, p. 108) or merely correlated with emotion while being generated by unconscious computations (e.g., Huebner et al. 2008). With one exception, all of the “personal” vignettes devised by Greene and colleagues (2001, 2004) and subsequently used by other researchers (e.g., Koenigs et al. 2007) in their fMRI and behavioral studies of emotional engagement in moral judgment involve violent crimes or torts. These studies thus do much more than highlight the role of emotion in moral judgment; they also support the classical rationalist thesis that moral rules are engraved in the mind.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 3
Keywords: emotion, neuroscience, law, intuition, computation, rules, crime, tort, battery, rape, murder, Darwin, Kant, Spencer, Greene
JEL Classification: D63, D64, K00, K13, K14Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: February 14, 2011 ; Last revised: October 26, 2012
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