Big Law and Risk Managment: Case Studies of Litigation, Deals, and Diversity
Anthony Victor Alfieri
University of Miami School of Law
February 14, 2011
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Vol. 24, p. 991, 2011
University of Miami Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-03
This Article explores new research directions in the study of large law firm risk governance norms and practices. The purpose of this ongoing study is to assess the impact of governance norms and practices on individual and institutional decision making under contemporary models of large law firm economics in the fields of litigation, deal transactions, and workplace employment, including hiring, promotion, and retention. The historic economic downturn that frames this inquiry weighs heavily on traditional models of large law firm economics, exacerbating structural tensions and ratcheting up institutional pressures on partners, associates, and the workplace as a whole. Experienced on both local and global scales, these tensions and pressures shape the day-to-day judgments of lawyers in corporate boardrooms, federal and state courtrooms, and law firm suites. Together, they mold risk-averse and risk-taking behavior in the lawyering process and in law firm management.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
Date posted: February 15, 2011 ; Last revised: August 24, 2011
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