Curing Spam: Rights, Signals & Screens

Van Alstyne, Marshall

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1762214

Abstract

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Curing Spam: Rights, Signals & Screens

Marshall W. Van Alstyne

Boston University - Department of Management Information Systems; MIT Sloan School

April 2007

MIT Sloan Research Paper, Forthcoming
Boston U. School of Management Research Paper, Forthcoming

Abstract:
Recognizing spam as a pollution problem points to a market-based approach that could be more effective than prior approaches based on either technology or law. Combining insights from externality economics and information asymmetry, I argue that an imperfect market can create more value for users than even a hypothetical "perfect" filter.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 4

Keywords: Externalities, Information Asymmetry, Signaling, Screening, Attention Markets, Coase Theorem

JEL Classification: C72, C78, D23, D6, D82, H21, O30

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Date posted: February 16, 2011

Suggested Citation

Van Alstyne, Marshall W., Curing Spam: Rights, Signals & Screens (April 2007). MIT Sloan Research Paper, Forthcoming; Boston U. School of Management Research Paper, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1762214 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1762214

Contact Information

Marshall W. Van Alstyne (Contact Author) Boston University - Department of Management Information Systems ( email ) 595 Commonwealth Avenue Boston, MA 02215 United States 617-358-3571 (Phone) HOME PAGE: http://smgapps.bu.edu/mgmt_new/profiles/VanAlstyneMarshall.html
MIT Sloan School ( email ) Center for Digital Business 5 Cambridge Center - NE25, 7th Floor Cambridge, MA 02142 United States 617-253-0768 (Phone) HOME PAGE: http://web.mit.edu/marshall/www/home.html

Abstract

Curing Spam: Rights, Signals & Screens

Marshall W. Van Alstyne

Date posted: February 16, 2011

Suggested Citation

Contact Information

Marshall W. Van Alstyne (Contact Author)