Curing Spam: Rights, Signals & Screens
Marshall W. Van Alstyne
Boston University - Department of Management Information Systems; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School
MIT Sloan Research Paper, Forthcoming
Boston U. School of Management Research Paper, Forthcoming
Recognizing spam as a pollution problem points to a market-based approach that could be more effective than prior approaches based on either technology or law. Combining insights from externality economics and information asymmetry, I argue that an imperfect market can create more value for users than even a hypothetical "perfect" filter.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 4
Keywords: Externalities, Information Asymmetry, Signaling, Screening, Attention Markets, Coase Theorem
JEL Classification: C72, C78, D23, D6, D82, H21, O30working papers series
Date posted: February 16, 2011
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