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The Effects of LBO Events on Industry Rivals


Jeffrey Oxman


University of St. Thomas (Minnesota) - University of St. Thomas, Minneapolis

Yildiray Yildirim


Syracuse University - Whitman School of Management

September 1, 2011

Midwest Finance Association 2012 Annual Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
The rivals of LBO targets experience an abnormal return on equity of 1.2% in the seven day window surrounding the LBO announcement. There are three hypotheses that may explain the wealth effects: the Pure Acquisition Hypothesis, the Competition Dynamics Hypothesis, and the Private Information Hypothesis. Our analysis provides the most support for the Pure Acquisition Hypothesis, which attributes the wealth effect to the increased probability of the rival firm receiving an LBO offer. We also find support for a version of the Private Information Hypothesis, if the private information is considered to be a general undervaluation of firms in the industry. There is comparatively little support for the Competition Dynamics Hypothesis. This is the first paper to test all three of these hypotheses in the same framework, and updates the existing literature on the subject for the second LBO wave of the late 1990s and 2000s.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Company finance, Corporate investment, Leveraged buyouts, Firm behavior

JEL Classification: G31, G32, G34, L22

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Date posted: February 21, 2011 ; Last revised: October 2, 2011

Suggested Citation

Oxman, Jeffrey and Yildirim, Yildiray, The Effects of LBO Events on Industry Rivals (September 1, 2011). Midwest Finance Association 2012 Annual Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1763913 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1763913

Contact Information

Jeffrey Oxman (Contact Author)
University of St. Thomas (Minnesota) - University of St. Thomas, Minneapolis ( email )
1000 LaSalle Ave.
Minneapolis, MN 55403
United States
Yildiray Yildrim
Syracuse University - Whitman School of Management ( email )
721 University Ave Suite 500
Syracuse, NY 13244
1-315-443-4885 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://myweb.whitman.syr.edu/yildiray/
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