Antitrust Immunity Grants to Joint Venture Agreements: Evidence from International Airline Alliances

28 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2011 Last revised: 27 Aug 2023

See all articles by William Gillespie

William Gillespie

Government of the United States of America - Antitrust Division

Oliver M. Richard

U.S. Department of Justice - Economic Analysis Group - Antitrust Division

Date Written: April 15, 2012

Abstract

This article provides evidence from the airline industry on the competitive effects of grants of antitrust immunity by regulatory agencies to certain joint venture agreements. In the airline industry, the U.S. Department of Transportation retains the statutory authority to approve and immunize from the U.S. antitrust laws, under a public interest standard, joint venture agreements relating to international air transportation. Agreements subject to this statute include international airline alliances, which are marketing joint ventures between carriers worldwide. The evidence based on data for the period 2005-2011 shows that recent grants of antitrust immunity to international airline alliances affecting U.S.-E.U. passengers would have raised concerns under an antitrust standard.

Keywords: Antitrust, Immunity, Grant, Joint Venture, International, Airline, Alliance

JEL Classification: L10, L40, L50, L93

Suggested Citation

Gillespie, William and Richard, Oliver M., Antitrust Immunity Grants to Joint Venture Agreements: Evidence from International Airline Alliances (April 15, 2012). Antitrust Law Journal , Vol. 78, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1764083 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1764083

William Gillespie

Government of the United States of America - Antitrust Division ( email )

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States

Oliver M. Richard (Contact Author)

U.S. Department of Justice - Economic Analysis Group - Antitrust Division ( email )

450 Fifth Street, NW
Ninth Floor
Washington, DC 20530
United States

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