Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1764083
 
 

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Antitrust Immunity Grants to Joint Venture Agreements: Evidence from International Airline Alliances


William Gillespie


Government of the United States of America - Antitrust Division

Oliver M. Richard


U.S. Department of Justice - Economic Analysis Group - Antitrust Division

April 15, 2012

Antitrust Law Journal , Vol. 78, 2012

Abstract:     
This article provides evidence from the airline industry on the competitive effects of grants of antitrust immunity by regulatory agencies to certain joint venture agreements. In the airline industry, the U.S. Department of Transportation retains the statutory authority to approve and immunize from the U.S. antitrust laws, under a public interest standard, joint venture agreements relating to international air transportation. Agreements subject to this statute include international airline alliances, which are marketing joint ventures between carriers worldwide. The evidence based on data for the period 2005-2011 shows that recent grants of antitrust immunity to international airline alliances affecting U.S.-E.U. passengers would have raised concerns under an antitrust standard.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: Antitrust, Immunity, Grant, Joint Venture, International, Airline, Alliance

JEL Classification: L10, L40, L50, L93

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Date posted: February 20, 2011 ; Last revised: July 22, 2012

Suggested Citation

Gillespie, William and Richard, Oliver M., Antitrust Immunity Grants to Joint Venture Agreements: Evidence from International Airline Alliances (April 15, 2012). Antitrust Law Journal , Vol. 78, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1764083 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1764083

Contact Information

William Gillespie
Government of the United States of America - Antitrust Division ( email )
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States
Oliver M. Richard (Contact Author)
U.S. Department of Justice - Economic Analysis Group - Antitrust Division ( email )
450 Fifth Street, NW
Ninth Floor
Washington, DC 20530
United States
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