Future Strategy: National Security in an Fiscally Austere Era

Abstract

Political violence, defined as actions taken for political purposes that harm humans, has long been a part of the international environment. While United States national and military strategy have historically focused on what appeared as the greatest threat - state versus state political violence - it has often engaged in fighting many 'small wars' against state and non-state actors. Unfortunately, the lessons of these wars were soon forgotten as the United States returned to a state versus state paradigm. The September 11, 2001 shock of attacks by Al Qaeda brought calls by U.S. political leaders for a war on terrorism that led to state versus state conflict but also violence against transnational and national terrorists in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. These groups relied on terrorism as an asymmetric insurgency tactic for which the United States and its military were once again ill prepared. National and military strategies underwent a sea change as they were forced to adjust from preparations for war against a rogue or rising state to recalling counterinsurgency lessons from the past and implementing them via new doctrine and training. While national and military strategy have adjusted, the bigger question for future national security is what form the United States national and military strategy should take after major deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have come to an end. Just as important, the corollary question of how the United States military should be sized and structured to execute these strategies in what is sure to be a fiscally austere environment must be resolved. This paper will examine these critical national security dilemmas.