Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1767343
 
 

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Standardization and Markets: Just Exactly Who is the Government, and Why Should Antitrust Care?


Chris Sagers


Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University

February 22, 2011

Oregon Law Review, Vol. 89, 2011
Cleveland-Marshall Legal Studies Paper No. 11-205

Abstract:     
We take for granted that the basic choice in public policy is between allocation of resources by government bureaucracy, on the one hand, or allocation by markets, on the other. But that dichotomy is false, and at least under contemporary circumstances it is more accurate to describe the choice as between allocation by one kind of bureaucracy and allocation by a different kind of bureaucracy. This poses a problem for our antitrust policy, because it lacks any coherent guidance as to how to address those entities and transactions that are not governmental but are also not simply market-governed. This paper extensively examines one particular sector that nicely demonstrates how false the simple bureaucracy-markets dichotomy really is: the standard setting sector. Standardization is ubiquitous and hugely influential, but it is difficult to capture as either a government phenomenon or a market phenomenon.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 65

Keywords: Standards, Standardization, Standard Setting Organizations, Antitrust, Competition, Competition Policy, Public Private Distinction, Privatization

JEL Classification: B25, B52, D02, D2, D23, D4, D43, D59, D7, D71, D72, D73, D78, H1, H7, K2, K21, K23, L1, L14, L15, L2

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Date posted: February 22, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Sagers, Chris, Standardization and Markets: Just Exactly Who is the Government, and Why Should Antitrust Care? (February 22, 2011). Oregon Law Review, Vol. 89, 2011; Cleveland-Marshall Legal Studies Paper No. 11-205. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1767343

Contact Information

Chris Sagers (Contact Author)
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University ( email )
2121 Euclid Avenue, LB 138
Cleveland, OH 44115-2214
United States
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