Noisy Signaling in Monopoly
Leonard J. Mirman
University of Virginia - Department of Economics
HEC Montreal, Institute of Applied Economics; Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi (CIRPÉE)
January 6, 2012
We provide a closed-form solution of the monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers, as well as expressions for the effects of noise on output, price, and information flows.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Monopoly, Learning, Noise, Quality, Signaling
JEL Classification: D21, D42, D82, D83, D84, L12, L15working papers series
Date posted: February 25, 2011 ; Last revised: September 19, 2012
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