Noisy Signaling in Monopoly

Mirman, Leonard; Santugini, Marc

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1769003

Abstract

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Noisy Signaling in Monopoly

Leonard J. Mirman

University of Virginia - Department of Economics

HEC Montreal, Institute of Applied Economics; Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi (CIRPÉE)

January 6, 2012

Abstract:
We provide a closed-form solution of the monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers, as well as expressions for the effects of noise on output, price, and information flows.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Monopoly, Learning, Noise, Quality, Signaling

JEL Classification: D21, D42, D82, D83, D84, L12, L15

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Date posted: February 25, 2011 ; Last revised: September 19, 2012

Suggested Citation

Mirman, Leonard J. and Santugini, Marc, Noisy Signaling in Monopoly (January 6, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1769003 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1769003

Contact Information

Leonard J. Mirman University of Virginia (UVA) - Department of Economics ( email ) P.O. Box 400182 114 Rouss Hall Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182 United States 434-924-6756 (Phone) 434-982-2904 (Fax)
Marc Santugini (Contact Author) HEC Montreal, Institute of Applied Economics ( email ) 3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine Montreal, Quebec H2X 2L3 Canada
Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi (CIRPÉE) ( email ) Pavillon De Sève Ste-Foy, Quebec G1K 7P4 Canada

Abstract

Citations (1)

Noisy Signaling in Monopoly

Leonard J. Mirman

Marc Santugini

Date posted: February 25, 2011 ; Last revised: September 19, 2012

Suggested Citation

Contact Information

Leonard J. Mirman

Marc Santugini (Contact Author)