Abstract

 


 



Government Intervention and Strategic Trading in the U.S. Treasury Market


Paolo Pasquariello


University of Michigan - Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Clara Vega


Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

January 13, 2012


Abstract:     
We study the impact of outright (i.e., permanent) open market operations (POMOs) by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) on the microstructure of the secondary U.S. Treasury market. POMOs are trades in U.S. Treasury securities aimed at accomplishing the Federal Reserve's target level of the federal funds rate. Our analysis is motivated by a parsimonious model of speculative trading in the presence of a stylized Central Bank targeting the price of the traded asset. Contrary to previous studies of government intervention in financial markets, we show that such trading activity improves equilibrium market liquidity, and that the magnitude of this effect is sensitive to the market's information environment. We test these implications by analyzing a novel sample of intraday U.S. Treasury bond price quotes (from BrokerTec) and a proprietary dataset of all POMOs conducted by the FRBNY between 2001 and 2007. Our evidence suggests that i) bid-ask spreads of on-the-run Treasury securities decline on days when POMOs are executed; and ii) POMOs' positive liquidity externalities are increasing in proxies for information heterogeneity among speculators, fundamental volatility, and policy uncertainty, consistent with our model.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Treasury Bond Markets, Open Market Operations, Central Bank, Government Interventions, Strategic Trading, Market Microstructure, Liquidity

JEL Classification: E44, G14

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Date posted: February 26, 2011 ; Last revised: March 15, 2012

Suggested Citation

Pasquariello, Paolo and Vega, Clara, Government Intervention and Strategic Trading in the U.S. Treasury Market (January 13, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1769773 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1769773

Contact Information

Paolo Pasquariello (Contact Author)
University of Michigan - Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )
701 Tappan Street
Room D5210
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-764-9286 (Phone)
240-526-7168 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/ppasquar/
Clara Vega
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )
20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.federalreserve.gov/research/staff/vegaclarax.htm
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