Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1770031
 
 

Citations (2)



 
 

Footnotes (30)



 


 



Does Product Liability Make Us Safer?


W. Kip Viscusi


Vanderbilt University - Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Vanderbilt University - Department of Economics; Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management; Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

February 28, 2011

Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-11

Abstract:     
Although a fundamental objective of tort liability is to promote safety, the performance of product liability has been more mixed. Safety levels have increased steadily over the past century for reasons wholly apart from tort liability, such as increases in societal wealth and technological progress. Low and moderate levels of liability enhance new product introductions and safety innovations, but high levels of liability have the opposite effect. Similar results are found for new product introductions, patents, and rates of R&D. There is no empirical evidence of a deterrent effect of punitive damages. Jury decision making is hindered by hindsight bias and other cognitive failures, which creates excessive aversion to novel risks associated with innovative products. Jurors’ biases against corporate risk analyses discourages systematic analysis of product risks and potentially beneficial new products.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: tort liability, product liability

JEL Classification: K13, K32

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 27, 2011 ; Last revised: November 27, 2012

Suggested Citation

Viscusi, W. Kip, Does Product Liability Make Us Safer? (February 28, 2011). Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1770031 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1770031

Contact Information

W. Kip Viscusi (Contact Author)
Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
615-343-7715 (Phone)
615-322-5953 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/viscusi.htm
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Vanderbilt University - Department of Economics
Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States
(615) 343-7715 (Phone)
(615) 343-5953 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/viscusi.htm
Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management
401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
(615) 343-7715 (Phone)
(615) 343-5953 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/viscusi.htm
Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )
Nashville, TN 37203
United States

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,263
Downloads: 253
Download Rank: 41,157
Citations:  2
Footnotes:  30

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.375 seconds