Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1772815
 
 

References (5)



 
 

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Temptation at Work


Alessandro Bucciol


University of Verona - Department of Economics; Netspar

Daniel Houser


George Mason University - Department of Economics

Marco Piovesan


University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

February 21, 2011

PLoS One, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2013
Harvard Business School Research Paper No. 11-090

Abstract:     
To encourage worker productivity offices prohibit Internet use. Consequently, many employees delay Internet activity to the end of the workday. Recent work in social psychology, however, suggests that using willpower to delay gratification can negatively impact performance. We report data from an experiment where subjects in a Willpower Treatment are asked to resist the temptation to join others in watching a humorous video for 10 minutes. In relation to a baseline treatment that does not require willpower, we show that resisting this temptation detrimentally impacts economic productivity on a subsequent task.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: Temptation, Willpower, Lab Experiment

JEL Classification: C93, D01

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Date posted: February 28, 2011 ; Last revised: January 11, 2014

Suggested Citation

Bucciol, Alessandro and Houser, Daniel and Piovesan, Marco, Temptation at Work (February 21, 2011). PLoS One, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2013; Harvard Business School Research Paper No. 11-090. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1772815 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1772815

Contact Information

Alessandro Bucciol
University of Verona - Department of Economics ( email )
Via dell'Artigliere 19
Verona, 37129
Italy
+39 045.842.5448 (Phone)
+39 045.802.8529 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.sites.google.com/site/abucciol/
Netspar ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Daniel Houser
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
Marco Piovesan (Contact Author)
University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )
Copenhagen University Library
Licenssekretariatet Nørre Alle 49
DK-2200 Copenhagen N.
Denmark
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ku.dk/piovesan/
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