CEO Mobility and the CEO-Firm Match: Evidence from CEO Employment History
Harley E. Ryan Jr.
Georgia State University - Department of Finance
Tulane University - Finance & Economics
July 16, 2012
We use data on the employment histories of CEOs to examine the relation between the CEO’s labor-market mobility and the CEO-firm match. Mobile CEOs match with firms that exhibit poor performance, face revenue shocks, and offer risk-sensitive compensation. At these firms, mobile CEOs increase shareholder value, improve operating performance, increase performance volatility, increase idiosyncratic equity risk, and alter asset structure. Our results suggest that mobile CEOs are fundamentally different from stationary CEOs and that the board recognizes these differences ex ante. The firm’s needs and the CEO’s attributes influence the CEO-firm match, and this match influences firm value and strategy.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 55
Keywords: CEO Experience, CEO-firm Match, Firm Performance, Firm Policies, Employment History
JEL Classification: G30, G32, G34, J6
Date posted: March 1, 2011 ; Last revised: July 18, 2012
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