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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1774263
 
 

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Finance and Governance in Developing Economies


Randall Morck


University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

February 28, 2011


Abstract:     
Classic Big Push industrialization envisions state planners coordinating economic activity to internalize a range of externalities that otherwise lock in a low-income equilibrium, but runs afoul of well-known government failure problems. Successful Big Push coordination may occur instead when a large business group, acting in its controlling shareholder’s self-interest, coordinates the establishment and expansion of businesses in diverse sectors. Where business groups play this role, many basic axioms of Anglo-American corporate governance, including the advocacy of shareholder value maximization and contestable corporate control, must be qualified.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Big Push, business groups, family firms, Network externalities, rent seeking, public choice

JEL Classification: G3, O1, O25, P11

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Date posted: March 3, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Morck, Randall, Finance and Governance in Developing Economies (February 28, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1774263 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1774263

Contact Information

Randall K. Morck (Contact Author)
University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis ( email )
2-32C Business Building
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
780-492-5683 (Phone)
780-492-3325 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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