Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1775443
 
 

Footnotes (330)



 


 



Recusal Legislating: Congress’s Answer to Institutional Stalemate


Michael Teter


University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law

March 2, 2011

Harvard Journal on Legislation, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2011

Abstract:     
Americans have grown accustomed to, but no less tired of, congressional gridlock. Although the Framers intentionally designed a system that would make lawmaking difficult, they did so with an eye toward ensuring broad consensus before policy enactment. There are times, however, when organizational structures and norms combine with electoral constraints and ambitions to create legislative stalemate despite widespread agreement on not only the need to act, but also on the substance of the necessary policy. These occasions rightfully spark frustration from both inside and outside Congress. Yet it has gone largely unnoticed that, recognizing this problem, Congress has devised a mechanism for overcoming deadlock by “recusing” itself from particular areas of policy development. In these cases, Congress combines delegation of substantial policymaking authority to a non-administrative agency with expedited congressional consideration of the delegatee’s self-effectuating proposal. Drawing on three contrasting examples, this Article creates a framework for understanding the concept of recusal legislating. It identifies the key motivations and benefits of recusal legislating and considers the device’s role in resolving future legislative impasses.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: March 4, 2011 ; Last revised: February 6, 2013

Suggested Citation

Teter, Michael, Recusal Legislating: Congress’s Answer to Institutional Stalemate (March 2, 2011). Harvard Journal on Legislation, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1775443

Contact Information

Michael Teter (Contact Author)
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law ( email )
332 S. 1400 East, Room 101
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-0730
United States

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 410
Downloads: 41
Footnotes:  330

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.344 seconds