Shareholder Rights, Managerial Incentives, and Firm Value
University of Utah - Department of Finance
December 8, 2014
This paper investigates interactions between two central corporate governance mechanisms: shareholder rights and managerial ownership. I find that the effect of managerial ownership on firm value crucially depends on shareholder rights. Managerial ownership enhances firm value when shareholder rights are strong, but reduces firm value when shareholder rights are weak. Announcement returns of manager share purchases in the open market are also lower for firms with weak shareholder rights. Furthermore, firms with weak shareholder rights have significantly lower managerial ownership. My findings suggest that shareholder rights and managerial ownership are complementary governance mechanisms.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 53
Keywords: Antitakeover provisions, managerial incentives, firm value, compensation contract
JEL Classification: G32, G34
Date posted: March 6, 2011 ; Last revised: December 9, 2014
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