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Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests


Roman M. Sheremeta


Chapman University

Subhasish M. Chowdhury


University of East Anglia - School of Economics, Center for Competition Policy, and Center for Experimental and Behavioral Social Science
September 16, 2010


Abstract:     
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests and show that asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also identify contests in the literature where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

Keywords: Rent-Seeking, Contest, Asymmetric Equilibrium, Multiple Equilibria

JEL Classification: C62, C72, D72, D74

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Date posted: March 6, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Sheremeta, Roman M. and Chowdhury, Subhasish M., Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests (September 16, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1778623 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1778623

Contact Information

Roman M. Sheremeta (Contact Author)
Chapman University ( email )
Orange, CA 92866
United States
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/romansheremeta/
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
University of East Anglia - School of Economics, Center for Competition Policy, and Center for Experimental and Behavioral Social Science ( email )
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
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