Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests
Roman M. Sheremeta
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
University of East Anglia - School of Economics, Center for Competition Policy, and Center for Experimental and Behavioral Social Science
September 16, 2010
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests and show that asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also identify contests in the literature where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 9
Keywords: Rent-Seeking, Contest, Asymmetric Equilibrium, Multiple Equilibria
JEL Classification: C62, C72, D72, D74working papers series
Date posted: March 6, 2011
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