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Existence of Nash Networks and Partner HeterogeneityPascal BillandJean Monnet University Christophe BravardJean Monnet University, Saint-Etienne - CREUSET Sudipta SarangiLouisiana State University, Baton Rouge - Department of Economics March 2011 GATE Working Paper No. 1111 Abstract: In this paper, we pursue the work of H. Haller and al. (2005, [10]) and examine the existence of equilibrium networks, called Nash networks, in the noncooperative two-way flow model (Bala and Goyal, 2000, [1]) with partner heterogeneous agents. We show through an example that Nash networks do not always exist in such a context. We then restrict the payoff function, in order to find conditions under which Nash networks always exist. We give two properties: increasing differences and convexity in the first argument of the payoff function, that ensure the existence of Nash networks. It is worth noting that linear payoff functions satisfy the previous properties.
Keywords: Nash networks, two-way flow models, partner heterogeneity JEL Classification: C72, D85 working papers seriesDate posted: March 9, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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