Bank Executive Compensation and Capital Requirements Reform
University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Finance
Brian J. Bolton
Portland State University - School of Business Administration
We study the executive compensation structure in the largest 14 U.S. financial institutions during 2000-2008. Our results are mostly consistent with and supportive of the findings of Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010), that is, managerial incentives matter – incentives generated by executive compensation programs led to excessive risk-taking by banks leading to the current financial crisis. Also, our results are generally not supportive of the conclusions of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) that the poor performance of banks during the crisis was the result of unforeseen risk.
We recommend the following compensation structure for senior bank executives: Executive incentive compensation should only consist of restricted stock and restricted stock options – restricted in the sense that the executive cannot sell the shares or exercise the options for two to four years after their last day in office.
The above equity based incentive programs lose their effectiveness in motivating managers to enhance shareholder value as a bank’s equity value approaches zero (as they did for the too-big-to-fail banks in 2008). Hence, for equity based incentive structures to be effective, banks should be financed with considerable more equity than they are being financed currently.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 81
Keywords: Executive Compensation, Bank Capital, Bank Capital Reform
JEL Classification: G21, G32, G34
Date posted: March 9, 2011 ; Last revised: May 22, 2013
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