Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782211
 
 

References (25)



 
 

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Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual Pivot Mechanism


Sham Kakade


University of Pennsylvania - Statistics Department

Ilan Lobel


New York University (NYU)

Hamid Nazerzadeh


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

March 2013


Abstract:     
We consider the problem of designing optimal mechanisms for settings where agents have dynamic private information. We present the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism, that is optimal in a large class of environments that satisfy a separability condition. The mechanism satisfies a rather strong equilibrium notion (it is periodic ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational). We provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for immediate incentive compatibility for mechanisms that satisfy periodic ex-post incentive compatibility in future periods. The result also yields a strikingly simple mechanism for selling a sequence of items to a single buyer. We also show the allocation rule of the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism has a very simple structure (a Virtual Index) in multi-armed bandit settings. Finally, we show through examples that the relaxation technique we use does not produce optimal dynamic mechanisms in general non-separable environments.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: optimal mechanism design, dynamic mechanism design, dynamic private information

JEL Classification: D82, C73

working papers series


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Date posted: March 10, 2011 ; Last revised: February 14, 2014

Suggested Citation

Kakade, Sham and Lobel, Ilan and Nazerzadeh, Hamid, Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual Pivot Mechanism (March 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782211 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1782211

Contact Information

Sham Kakade
University of Pennsylvania - Statistics Department ( email )
Wharton School
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Ilan Lobel (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) ( email )
Bobst Library, E-resource Acquisitions
20 Cooper Square 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10003-711
United States
Hamid Nazerzadeh
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )
701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
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