Tougher Educational Exam Leading to Worse Selection
Eduardo De Carvalho Andrade
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Luciano I. De Castro
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics
Economics Discussion Paper No. 2011-2
A parallel of education with transformative processes in standard markets suggest that a more severe control of the quality of the output will improve the overall quality of the education. This paper shows a somehow counterintuitive result: an increase in the exam difficulty may reduce the average quality (productivity) of selected individuals. Since the exam does not verify all skills, when its standard rises, candidates with relatively low skills emphasized in the test and high skills demanded in the job may no longer qualify. Hence, an increase in the testing standard may be counterproductive. One implication is that policies should emphasize alignment between the skills tested and those required in the actual jobs, rather than increase exams' difficulties.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26
Keywords: school standards, signaling model, cognitive skills, non-cognitive skills
JEL Classification: I2, J24working papers series
Date posted: March 14, 2011
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