The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law
Robert H. Sitkoff
Harvard Law School
March 10, 2011
Boston University Law Review, Vol. 91, p. 1041, 2011
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 689
This essay revisits the economic theory of fiduciary law. Nearly two decades have passed since the publication of the seminal economic analyses of fiduciary law by Cooter and Freedman (1991), and by Easterbrook and Fischel (1993), which together have come to underpin the prevailing economic, contractarian model of fiduciary law. The economic theory of agency that motivates those papers has come to permeate the literature on law and legal institutions generally. The law-and-economics movement has matured further, developing new tools and refining its understanding of previously applied concepts. The purpose of this essay is to restate the economic theory of fiduciary law in an updated and accessible synthesis.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 13
JEL Classification: D86, J41, K11, K12, K22, L14
Date posted: March 11, 2011 ; Last revised: July 25, 2012
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