Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783629
 


 



The New Hungarian Rules on Damages Caused by Horizontal Hardcore Cartels: Presumed Price Increase and Limited Protection for Whistleblowers – An Analytical Introduction


Csongor István Nagy


University of Szeged, Faculty of Law; Budapest University of Technology and Economics

March 15, 2010

European Competition Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 63-67, 2011

Abstract:     
The paper analyzes and evaluates the recently adopted Hungarian rules on damage liability in competition matters, which introduced a presumption that horizontal hardcore cartels lead to a 10% price increase and try to reconcile the ends of actions for damages and the leniency policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

Keywords: Antitrust, Actions for Damages, Competition Law, EU Law, Hungarian Law, Leniency Policy, Private Enforcement, Quantum of Damages, Tort Law

JEL Classification: K13, K21

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Date posted: March 11, 2011 ; Last revised: March 14, 2011

Suggested Citation

Nagy, Csongor István, The New Hungarian Rules on Damages Caused by Horizontal Hardcore Cartels: Presumed Price Increase and Limited Protection for Whistleblowers – An Analytical Introduction (March 15, 2010). European Competition Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 63-67, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783629

Contact Information

Csongor István Nagy (Contact Author)
University of Szeged, Faculty of Law ( email )
Rákóczi tér 1.
H-6722 Szeged, 6722
Hungary
Budapest University of Technology and Economics ( email )
Budafoki ut 8.
Budapest, 1111
Hungary
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