The New Hungarian Rules on Damages Caused by Horizontal Hardcore Cartels: Presumed Price Increase and Limited Protection for Whistleblowers – An Analytical Introduction
Csongor István Nagy
University of Szeged, Faculty of Law; Hungarian Academy of Sciences CSS Institute for Legal Studies
March 15, 2010
European Competition Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 63-67, 2011
The paper analyzes and evaluates the recently adopted Hungarian rules on damage liability in competition matters, which introduced a presumption that horizontal hardcore cartels lead to a 10% price increase and try to reconcile the ends of actions for damages and the leniency policy.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 9
Keywords: Antitrust, Actions for Damages, Competition Law, EU Law, Hungarian Law, Leniency Policy, Private Enforcement, Quantum of Damages, Tort Law
JEL Classification: K13, K21
Date posted: March 11, 2011 ; Last revised: March 14, 2011
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