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Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining


John Yoo


University of California at Berkeley School of Law


Cornell Law Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, 2011
UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1783750

Abstract:     
This paper examines the continuing difference between the Constitution’s Article II treaty, and the congressional-executive agreement’s statutory process, to make international agreements. Rather than approach the problem from a textual or historical perspective, it employs a rational choice model of dispute resolution between nation-states in conditions of weak to little enforcement by supranational institutions. It argues that the choice of a treaty or congressional-executive agreement can make an important difference in overcoming various difficulties in bargaining that arise from imperfect information and commitment problems.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: treaties, international agreements, bargaining, President, Senate, foreign relations

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Date posted: March 13, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Yoo, John, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining. Cornell Law Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, 2011; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1783750. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783750

Contact Information

John Choon Yoo (Contact Author)
University of California at Berkeley School of Law ( email )
Boalt Hall
890 Simon
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-643-5089 (Phone)
510-643-2673 (Fax)
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